

TABLE 4A.1 Continued

Object	1976		1980		1984		1988		1992		1996	
	Valence	MLE	Valence	MLE	Valence	MLE	Valence	MLE	Valence	MLE	Valence	MLE
<i>Candidates</i>												
General	-.2	.68	10.2	.65	-4.6	1.20	4.3	.42	13.6	.86	7.8	1.26
Record-Incumbency	-1.9	.73	-.5	.71	-30.2	.47	-29.8	.76	-8.3	.79	-9.4	NS
Experience	-21.1	.44	13.3	NS	-9.3	.34	-44.6	NS	-42.2	.46	-33.6	NS
Management	-20.4	.64	-24.3	.57	-1.2	.48	-6.9	.29	5.7	.46	-7.4	.57
Intelligence	-1.6	.27	12.0	NS	14.0	.32	3.7	.41	17.9	.51	18.8	NS
Trust	-9.2	.80	7.8	.31	-2.9	.55	5.6	NS	-12.7	.78	-37.9	1.85
Personality	-2.0	.47	-9.8	.57	-23.3	.28	7.2	NS	-13.1	.30	5.1	NS
<i>Parties</i>												
People in the Party	19.6	.25	6.8	NS	-17.7	.46	9.8	.32	8.4	NS	-.5	.67
Party Affect	6.0	.39	4.6	.39	8.7	.79	2.4	.50	8.4	.65	5.0	1.03
<i>Issues</i>												
General	.3	.48	-14.1	.75	-16.2	.78	-12.7	.83	1.9	1.04	-10.3	1.41
International Involvement	-11.6	.31	-15.8	1.30	2.7	.95	-4.8	1.22	-1.3	.71	-6.7	NS
Economic Management	24.9	1.10	-1.3	1.33	-.4	1.93	4.8	1.46	20.9	1.85	17.1	1.12
Social Benefits	19.1	.23	13.0	.63	26.8	.61	24.2	.95	32.5	.37	18.2	.85
Civil Liberties	-4.7	.28	7.4	.81	10.5	.57	-12.7	.92	8.0	1.70	2.7	1.27
Natural Resources	33.5	NS	-2.4	NS	44.5	NS	16.4	NS	34.0	.42	38.0	NS
Agriculture	31.4	.25	-9.1	NS	17.9	NS	9.7	.64	10.0	NS	-50.0	NS
% Correctly Predicted	85%		87%		90%		87%		91%		93%	

DATA SOURCE: 1952-1996 National Election Studies.

NOTE: Cell entries show partisan valences and standardized MLE coefficients. Positive valences favor the Democrats. NS = not significant at the .05 level.

## 5 The Effects of Campaign Finance Attitudes on Turnout and Vote Choice in the 2000 Elections

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The 107th Congress is unlikely to be remembered for its legislative achievements. With divided government, a slim majority in both houses, and all but one appropriations bill unfinished before the 2002 election, there was little of significance signed into law. One notable exception was the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), which was signed into law on March 27, 2002. This bill, which was supported by 56 percent of House members and 60 percent of Senators, included a ban on "soft money" contributions. As long as it was used for "party-building activities" and not "coordinated" with candidates' campaigns, soft money had previously been unregulated and could be contributed in unlimited amounts. Such contributions were widely viewed by critics as thinly veiled campaign activities that violated the spirit, if not the intent, of existing campaign finance laws. In the 2000 election cycle alone, roughly \$500 million was funneled into federal campaigns through soft-money contributions (Federal Election Commission 2001). The BCRA also restricted issue ads during the sixty days before an election. Although most of the public's attention and congressional debate focused on these new regulations, the law also deregulated some hard-money provisions. Specifically, individuals can now give \$2,000 to a candidate per election instead of \$1,000. This limit is raised for candidates facing a wealthy opponent who is personally funding his or her campaign. If they survive the constitutional challenges that are already pending, the provisions of the BCRA are expected to change the way campaigns are financed for years to come.

Several factors contributed to the passage of the BCRA. First, Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), sponsor of the bill and presidential candidate in the 2000 Republican primaries, demanded that the Senate consider the legislation

early in the session. This gave the bill enough time to pass both houses. Second, members of the House were able to force the bill to the floor despite opposition by the Republican leadership. Although these procedural tactics provide a partial explanation of why BCRA was passed, one question remains outstanding: Why did Congress suddenly decide to enact major campaign finance reform legislation after years of consideration? Was there something about the 2000 election that motivated members to pass campaign finance reform? Did this issue contribute to voters' decisional calculus in the 2000 elections, and, if so, what message did voters send to their elected officials?

In this chapter we investigate public attitudes toward campaign finance reform by using a uniquely suited data set, the 2000 American Politics Study. This data set contains information about citizens' attitudes toward a series of specific reform proposals, such as banning soft money, increasing contribution limits, and establishing a system of public financing. Using this data set we discern three general factors for categorizing one's preferences about campaign finance reform, which we identify as regulatory, deregulatory, and subsidy reforms.

We answer a series of important questions about the effects of the campaign finance issue in the 2000 elections. How deep and widespread was public support for campaign finance reform? Did candidates' arguments regarding campaign finance reform resonate with voters? Was campaign finance reform a decisive issue in the 2000 presidential election, or were traditional issues such as taxes and the economy more consequential? Incumbents in both the House and the Senate have been forced to take public votes on campaign finance reform legislation. What impact did the campaign finance issue have on the congressional races? Finally, did support for campaign finance reform increase voter turnout? In short, we find that campaign finance attitudes failed to rally voters who otherwise would not vote. However, once in the polling booth, voters' attitudes toward campaign finance influenced their choice of candidate.

### The Issue of Campaign Finance Reform

Campaign finance reform remains a controversial issue in large part because it forces individuals to consider and to balance the competing democratic values of political equality and free speech (Grant and Rudolph 2003). It is an issue that involves what Sniderman et al. (1996) refers to as a "clash of rights." These two competing democratic values frame the elite discourse on campaign finance. Proponents of reform argue that attitudes toward campaign finance reform should be guided by concerns about political equality and equal representation. They argue that economic inequalities pose a serious threat to political equality, allowing affluent individuals

and organized groups to exert undue influence in the political process (e.g., Adamany and Agree 1975; Fiss 1996; Foley 1994; Hasen 1996, 1999; Neuborne 1999a, 1999b; Raskin and Bonifaz 1993; Sunstein 1993, 1994; Wertheimer and Manes 1994). Because such individuals and groups are not representative of the mass electorate, reformers argue that their influence is problematic (Brown, Powell, and Wilcox 1995; Sorauf 1992; Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995). To impede the conversion of economic power into political power, reformers strongly advocate the adoption of more stringent campaign finance laws.

In framing their arguments, opponents of reform tend not to emphasize the principles of political equality and equal representation. Rather, invoking the First Amendment, they propose that campaign finance reform be viewed in terms of free speech (e.g., McConnell 2001; Smith 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2001). Those arguing that the use of money in campaigns is essentially a form of political speech, and thus should be protected under the First Amendment, favor deregulation. They submit that limitations on campaign contributions and expenditures are unconstitutional abridgments of free speech and vigorously oppose reformers' efforts to strengthen existing campaign finance regulations.

Political equality—versus—free speech arguments are difficult to balance. Despite repeated attempts, the Supreme Court has failed to satisfy either side of the campaign finance reform debate. In evaluating the constitutionality of the regulatory regime established by the Federal Election Campaign Act (1971) and its 1974 amendments, the Court rendered a somewhat mixed verdict. Although striking down the FECA's expenditure limits, the Court upheld the FECA's contribution limits as an acceptable protection against the reality or appearance of corruption. As evidenced by the growing body of case law, the *Buckley* decision clearly has failed to put the constitutional questions surrounding campaign finance regulations to rest (*Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committee*, 1985; *Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission*, 1996; *Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC*, 2000; *Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee*, 2001). Reformers argue that the Court needs to go further, and they seek more stringent regulations on campaign contributions and expenditures. Opponents, in contrast, submit that the current campaign finance system requires only deregulation.

### Candidate Positions on the Issue of Reform

The issue of campaign finance reform played a prominent role during the 2000 campaign season and was particularly visible at the presidential level. Senator McCain's presidential bid pushed campaign finance onto the

issue agenda simply because of his track record as a strong proponent of reform. But McCain's proposals are but one set of many that could be advocated. Reformers, scholars, and partisan elites have proposed a number of reforms over the years. Sorauf (1994) observes that the consensus agenda for mainstream reform is comprised of three broad proposals. He explains that reformers wish (1) to reduce the amount of "interested" money, such as contributions from PACs and other interest groups, (2) to reduce the amount of money raised and spent in campaigns, and (3) to eliminate loopholes in the current system like soft money and bundling. Each of these mainstream reforms may be classified as *regulatory* reforms.

One suggestion for reducing "interested" money is to enact *subsidy* reforms, an expanded public financing system to be used in both presidential and congressional elections (e.g., Ackerman 1993; Foley 1994; Hasen 1996; Magleby and Nelson 1990; Raskin and Bonifaz 1993; Wertheimer and Manes 1994). Supporters of public financing argue that such a move would decrease candidates' financial dependence on special interests. Others suggest that reducing communication costs associated with modern campaigns would minimize candidates' dependence on special-interest money (e.g., Magleby and Nelson 1990; Raskin and Bonifaz 1993). Magleby and Nelson (1990) propose subsidizing candidates' mailings and television advertising.

Not all reform proposals, however, have been designed to limit the amount of private money in political campaigns. In fact, many have argued that *deregulatory* reforms, rather than increased regulation, are the proper road to reform (e.g., Gais 1998; McConnell 2001). Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-KY) best articulates this position. Defending the rights of so-called special interests, McConnell argued that "[t]heir speech, political activity, and right to petition the government for a redress of grievances' (that is, to lobby) are protected by the First Amendment" (McConnell 2001).

Of these three types of reforms (regulatory, subsidy, and deregulatory), which ones were advocated by the presidential candidates? In the 2000 presidential election, Gore clearly supported regulatory reforms. Whether motivated by principled policy convictions, a desire to distance himself from questionable fund-raising practices during the 1996 campaign, or an interest in attracting former McCain presidential supporters, Al Gore made campaign finance reform a central pillar of his policy platform in his acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention: "If you entrust me with the presidency, I will put our democracy back in your hands, and get all the special-interest money—all of it—out of our democracy, by enacting campaign finance reform. I feel so strongly about this, I promise you that campaign finance reform will be the very first bill that Joe Lieberman [the Democratic vice-presidential candidate] and I send to Congress" (Gore 2000). Gore, along with the Democratic leadership in Congress, supported many provisions of the McCain-Feingold reform package, particularly its

ban on soft money. In addition, the Democratic party platform also called for a "crackdown on special interest issue ads" and a ubiquitous insistence on "tough new lobbying reform."

Gore also supported some subsidy reforms. While staying clear from an outright call for public funding of campaigns, he proposed a "public-private, non-partisan Democracy Endowment." This endowment would raise money from the private sector that would then finance congressional campaigns. If candidates accepted the funds, then they would not be allowed to accept campaign contributions from other sources. In addition, Gore, in the Democratic party platform, advocated "publicly-guaranteed tv time for debates and advocacy by candidates." As with his Democracy Endowment, this would not be publicly funded but would be a de facto subsidy for candidates.

George W. Bush did not make campaign finance reform a centerpiece of his campaign, but he did stake out clear positions on this issue, some of which were distinct from Gore's. Like Gore, Bush advocated regulatory reforms, including a ban on soft money. However, unlike Gore, Bush would have placed two exceptions on this regulation. First, he advocated this ban only if such a ban included "paycheck protection," a provision that would keep unions from using members' dues for political purposes without their consent. Second, Bush opposed banning soft-money contributions from individuals. Bush also advocated some regulatory reforms not explicitly supported by Gore. In particular, the platform includes a pledge to "level the playing field by forbidding incumbents to roll over their leftover campaign funds into a campaign for a different office." Thus, although Gore was more outspoken on his position for campaign finance reform, both Bush and Gore could both claim to advocate similar regulatory reforms.

The difference between Bush and Gore on this issue is distinct in the areas of subsidy and deregulatory reforms. Whereas Gore advocated some subsidy reforms, Bush favored deregulatory reforms. Although Bush supported full disclosure via the Internet, he fought regulations on the amount of money that interest groups could spend on issue-advocacy ads. Bush also favored an increase to the \$1,000 ceiling for individuals' contribution limits. In addition, the Republican platform included a provision to "Preserve the right of every individual and all groups—whether for us or against us—to express their opinions and advocate their issues. We will not allow any arm of government to restrict this constitutionally guaranteed right." This support for more deregulation is one point of difference between the parties on this issue.

Why should we expect public opinion on the issue of campaign finance to affect vote choice in the 2000 elections? Public-opinion scholars have observed that citizens' attitudes toward policy issues are powerfully influenced by elite discourse (Zaller 1992). Elite cues are important factors in opinion formation for several reasons. First, they reduce information costs for citi-

zens by reducing complex issues into simpler and more manageable parts. Most citizens are ill informed about the issue of campaign finance (Center for Responsive Politics 1997). By framing the issue in terms of more widespread and more accessible constructs such as free speech or political equality, elite cues make it relatively easy for citizens to form opinions on an otherwise complicated issue. Second, elite cues are often directional in that they encourage citizens to think about an issue in a positive or negative light.

In the debate over campaign finance reform, elite cues were usually, but not always, divided quite sharply along partisan lines. Consider first the issue of regulatory reform. Partisan cues on this issue were somewhat mixed, as both major parties advocated at least some forms of regulatory reform. As a result, rank-and-file partisans may not always have received clear signals from their leaders on this issue. If they are formed in the absence of distinct partisan cues, citizens' attitudes toward regulatory reform may later have little bearing on their choices between partisan candidates. On the issues of deregulatory and subsidy-based reform, however, cues from partisan elites were unmistakably clear. The Republican establishment repeatedly called for deregulatory reforms, either by raising contribution limits or by removing them entirely. The Democratic Party was unified in its opposition to such reforms. In contrast, many Democrats championed subsidy-based reform by calling for public financing or free television time. Virtually no Republicans supported such measures. Since they benefited from very clear and distinct cues from partisan elites, citizens' attitudes toward deregulatory and subsidy-based reforms can be expected to have a much stronger relationship to voting behavior than attitudes toward regulatory reform.

#### Public Attitudes toward Campaign Finance Reform

To gauge public support for campaign finance reform, we use data from the 2000 American Politics Study, a nationally representative survey specifically focused on campaign finance.<sup>1</sup> The survey was administered in the weeks following the 2000 election to measure public attitudes toward proposed campaign finance reforms.<sup>2</sup> We presented respondents with a list of ten reform proposals (submitted by reform debate players either formally or informally) and asked whether they strongly agreed, agreed, disagreed, or strongly disagreed with each of them. Respondents' attitudes toward these reform proposals are reported in Table 5.1.

The public is extremely supportive of reform proposals that would strengthen campaign finance regulations. A substantial majority (85.1%) agrees or strongly agrees that congressional candidates should be subject to spending limits. More than eight in ten Americans (84.1%) agree that congressional candidates ought to raise a certain percentage of their money in their home state. Nearly three-quarters of citizens (73.0%) favor a ban on

TABLE 5.1 Public support for campaign finance reform proposals

	Strong Disagree		Agree		Strong Agree		Total	N
	Disagree	Strong Disagree	Agree	Strong Agree	Disagree	Strong Agree		
Limit spending by candidates	0.7	14.2	67.4	17.7	100%		1201	
Limit TV advertising by candidates	2.3	29.9	49.2	18.6	100%		1210	
Ban soft-money contributions	2.1	24.8	57.6	15.4	100%		1103	
Ban PACs from giving money	2.0	39.8	49.6	8.7	100%		1118	
Require candidates to raise % of money in their home state	0.9	15.0	73.8	10.3	100%		1193	
Let individuals give more	4.1	52.2	41.2	2.5	100%		1194	
Let parties give more	7.3	58.8	32.6	1.2	100%		1170	
Remove limits, but disclosure	4.7	39.1	47.1	9.1	100%		1153	
Provide public funding	10.6	50.8	35.7	2.9	100%		1175	
Provide free media, postage	10.4	51.1	33.9	4.7	100%		1201	

DATA SOURCE: *American Politics Study 2000*.

soft money, and two-thirds (67.8%) favor limits on candidates' television advertising. A majority of Americans (58.3%) also supports a ban on contributions made by political action committees.

The American electorate expresses less support for the public financing of congressional elections. Slightly more than one-third of respondents (38.6%) favors the use of public funds to finance congressional elections. An equally small percentage supports the extension of free media time and postage to congressional candidates. The public, it seems, does not advocate proposals that achieve reform through public subsidies. The public expresses only modest support for deregulatory reforms. Less than one-half of respondents (43.7%) agree that individuals should be permitted to give more money to candidates. In addition, only one in three respondents (33.8%) feels that political parties should be allowed to contribute more money. Only one of the three deregulatory reforms enjoys majority support among the mass public. A slight majority (56.2%) favors the removal of contribution limits provided that full disclosure is ensured.<sup>3</sup>

Considerable variation remains in the public's attitudes toward alternative campaign finance reform proposals. In the next section we examine whether individuals' campaign finance attitudes impacted voter turnout and vote choice in the 2000 presidential and congressional elections.

#### Modeling the Effects of Campaign Finance Attitudes

We begin the modeling exercise by conducting an exploratory factor analysis of the ten reform proposals we discussed earlier. The goal of the factor analysis is to reduce the number of variables and to detect structure in the relationships between the variables. As we discussed previously, there are three types of reforms advocated in public debate—regulatory, subsidy,

TABLE 5.2 Factor analysis of campaign finance reform proposals

	Regulatory Reforms	Subsidy Reforms	Deregulatory Reforms
Limit spending by candidates	0.720	0.080	-0.031
Limit TV advertising by candidates	0.608	-0.186	-0.066
Ban soft-money contributions	0.632	0.246	-0.140
Ban PACs from giving money	0.676	0.088	-0.014
Require candidates to raise certain % of money in their home state	0.446	0.077	0.289
Allow individuals to give more	-0.122	0.067	0.788
Allow parties to give more	-0.372	0.218	0.615
Remove limits, require full disclosure	0.242	-0.154	0.545
Provide public funding	0.123	0.762	0.046
Provide free media time, postage	0.059	0.795	0.014
Eigenvalue	2.236	1.498	1.229

DATA SOURCE: *American Politics Study 2000*.

NOTE: The above results were obtained by factor analysis using direct oblimin rotation with Kaiser normalization.

and deregulatory reforms. The factor analysis results will then be used to model the effects of these attitudinal indices on voter turnout and presidential and congressional vote choice in the 2000 elections.

Table 5.2 shows that the rotated structure matrix produced three distinct factors, each of which corresponds to one of the forms of reforms. The first factor, "regulatory reform," accounts for about 22 percent of the total variance. Five proposals strengthening campaign finance regulations comprise the regulatory reform factor: limiting candidate spending, limiting television advertising, eliminating soft money, banning PAC contributions, and requiring money to be raised at home. A second factor, "subsidy reform," explains an additional 15 percent of the variance and is composed of the two proposals involving public subsidies: public funding for congressional candidates and free media time for candidates. A third factor, termed "deregulatory reform," accounts for an additional 12 percent of the variance. Three proposals that would loosen campaign finance regulations, allowing individuals to contribute more, allowing parties to contribute more, and eliminating contribution limits, constitute the third factor. Informed by these factor-analytic results, we created three factor-based indices of reform support: support for regulatory reform, support for deregulatory reform, and support for subsidy reform.<sup>4</sup>

In modeling the vote in the 2000 elections, our primary concern is to estimate the effect of support for these three forms of reform on the vote. For this issue voting to occur, it is important that the parties and candidates clearly delineate their differences on the issue (Key 1966; Page and Brody 1972; Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1983). At the elite level, attitudes toward subsidy and deregulatory campaign finance reform(s) are, for the most

part, divided quite cleanly along partisan lines. Democratic leaders tend to support subsidy reforms and to oppose deregulatory reforms. Conversely, the Republican establishment favors deregulatory reforms and opposes subsidy reforms. On mainstream regulatory reforms, the parties differ, but less substantially. As discussed previously, both Bush and Gore support some type of ban on soft-money contributions, some restrictions on advertising, and changes to the way lobbying is done. The differences are subtle, such as the paycheck protection, and thus may not be noticed by the average voter. Do such attitudinal differences at the elite level resonate at the mass level? Do citizens recognize parties' positions on particular campaign finance reforms, and do individuals' attitudes toward these reforms affect their voting decisions? If so, we expect that, given partisan differences at the elite level, supporters of subsidy reforms will be more likely to vote for Al Gore and Democratic candidates for Congress. Those who favor deregulatory reforms are expected to favor George W. Bush and Republican candidates for Congress. As for regulatory reforms, we expect that voters who support regulatory reforms will be more likely to vote for Democratic candidates, but this hypothesis depends on whether the average voter can distinguish between the parties on this issue.

We test whether voters based their decision to vote and for whom to vote for, at least in part, on these positions. Specifically, we estimate a model of turnout and presidential vote choice that includes three indices measuring support for three separate types of reforms: regulatory, deregulatory, and subsidy. We expect that the more one supports increased regulation, opposes deregulation, or supports subsidy reforms the more likely one is to vote for the Democratic candidate, Gore, rather than the Republican candidate, Bush. In addition, we test whether campaign finance reform, by turning out nonvoters and thus rallying supporters, served as a mobilizing issue. That is, those in favor of reform would be more likely both to support candidates who agree with them and to go to the polls for those candidates. Our model allows us to estimate the effect of the campaign finance issues at both stages of the vote decision. First, we include the measures of campaign finance reform attitudes as part of the decision to turn out. Second, we include them as part of the choice between candidates. Our model has two dependent variables:

$y_1 = 1$  if a respondent voted in the election

$y_2 = 1$  if the respondent voted for the Democratic candidate

Theoretically, two independent binomial models should not be used to estimate these decisions because the observation of the vote is censored; it cannot be observed unless a person votes. To account for this, we employ an extension of the bivariate probit model (cf. Greene 1997). Researchers

have used this estimator to model both voter turnout, where one cannot observe a citizen voting unless he or she is registered (Timpone 1998a), and the vote choice, where one first decides whether to vote (Dubin and Rivers 1989). Our work mimics the latter application. This model is

$$\begin{aligned} \gamma_1 = 0, \gamma_2 = 0: & \quad P(\gamma_1 = 0) = 1 - \Phi(\beta_1'x_1), \\ \gamma_1 = 1, \gamma_2 = 0: & \quad P(\gamma_1 = 1, \gamma_2 = 0) = \Phi_1[-\beta_1'x_1, \beta_1'x_1, -\rho], \\ \gamma_1 = 1, \gamma_2 = 1: & \quad P(\gamma_1 = 1, \gamma_2 = 1) = \Phi_2[\beta_1'x_1, \beta_1'x_1, \rho], \end{aligned}$$

where  $\gamma_1$  is a dichotomous dependent decision (1 = turnout; 0 = abstain), and  $\gamma_2$  is a successive dichotomous dependent decision (1 = vote for Democrat; 0 = vote for Republican). Unlike two independent binomial probit models, this model is a system where  $\Phi$  is the normal cumulative distribution function, and  $\Phi_2$  is the bivariate normal cumulative distribution function. The model depends not only on the effects of the independent variables but also on the correlation of the errors ( $\rho$ ).<sup>5</sup>

For the turnout portion of the model, we include measures of political engagement, partisanship, policy attitudes (with special attention given to campaign finance reform), and demographics. We include three measures of political engagement as determinants of turnout in our model. First, those who are more efficacious—those who think that their voice will be heard by government—should be more likely to vote. Second, those who have a higher level of interest in politics and elections should also be more likely to vote. Finally, increased political knowledge should raise the probability of turning out to vote. We include partisanship and expect that the surge and decline arguments of Campbell (1960) and Campbell (1987, 1992) will result in independents being less likely to vote than partisans. We include several measures of policy attitudes. These account for other sources of issue-based mobilization but also serve as controls for the ideology of the respondent. Specifically, we include the following: retrospective evaluations of the national economy, government spending, and the federal government's role in protecting family values. In addition, we include measures of a person's attitudes toward campaign finance reform. These measures are indices based on the factor analysis presented earlier. We include three measures of support for reform: regulatory, deregulatory, and subsidy campaign finance reforms. Lastly, we include several demographic measures. Those who are married, older, or have higher levels of education should be more likely to vote than those who are not. We include each of these measures as part of the turnout equation.

The variables we included as part of the candidate-choice portion of the model are very similar to the turnout model. Candidate choice is modeled by partisanship, policy attitudes, attitudes toward campaign finance reform,

and demographic characteristics. Our interest in this model centers upon whether, after controlling for partisanship, policy attitudes, and demographics, voters chose candidates based on their positions on campaign finance reform.

To identify the model, at least one of the coefficients must be constrained to zero in one of the models. That is, if there were a set of variables that should affect only one decision and not the other, then those should be constrained to zero. We constrain the political-engagement variables (efficacy, political interest, and knowledge) to zero for the candidate-choice equation. By constraining these variables we are able to estimate our statistical model.

Table 5.3 presents the results of the model. Of the three reform attitudes, deregulatory reform was the only one that was statistically significant from zero.<sup>6</sup> We interpret this as confirmation of our hypothesis that this is evidence of voters responding to the candidates who show clear differences on this issue. However, we do so hesitantly. The model does not include a general measure of ideology because the survey lacks data on this. As a result, we must be somewhat cautious in our interpretation because the deregulatory attitude may be a reflection of a more general stance against government regulation.<sup>7</sup> Finally, there is no evidence of issue mobilization, as none of the attitudes toward reform had an effect on voter turnout.

Consistent with the literature on presidential vote choice, voters base their choices on party identification, the economy, and policy attitudes. Of great interest to this analysis is the direction and statistical significance of the three campaign finance reform measures. Voter turnout, in contrast, is not based on issue mobilization but is determined by individual characteristics: efficacy, interest in politics, knowledge, and demographics, and, again, partisanship.

To compare the magnitude of the issues for candidate choice, we calculate the change in the predicted probabilities that a person would abstain from voting, would vote for Bush, or would vote for Gore. For each variable, we calculated the change in probabilities given a shift from a low value for the explanatory variable (greatest of either the mean minus two standard deviations or lowest value) to a high value (lowest of either mean plus two standard deviations or highest value), holding all other values at their respective means.<sup>8</sup> Table 5.4 presents the changes in the predicted probabilities.

As Table 5.4 clearly shows, attitudes toward deregulation of the campaign finance issue had a relatively large impact on presidential vote choice in 2000. Not surprisingly, partisanship has the largest impact on vote choice (Democrats have a 0.26 greater probability of voting for their candidate than Republicans; independents have a 0.25 greater probability). Of the issues in the model, deregulating the campaign finance system had the same impact on voting for Bush as attitudes toward government spending and the

TABLE 5.3 Model of presidential vote

	Voter Turnout	Vote for Gore
<i>Political Engagement</i>		
Efficacy	.535*** (.190)	—
Interest in Politics	1.205*** (.200)	—
Political Knowledge	.650* (.266)	—
<i>Partisanship</i>		
Democratic Identifier	-.102 (.133)	2.863*** (.180)
Independent	-.843*** (.212)	1.505*** (.315)
<i>Policy Attitudes</i>		
Economic Evaluation	.183 (.213)	.611* (.305)
Government Spending	-.082 (.266)	.958* (.392)
Middle-Class-Only Tax Cut	.059 (.238)	.239 (.362)
Family Values	-.148 (.236)	.759* (.339)
<i>Campaign Finance Reform</i>		
Regulatory Reforms	.405 (.456)	-.369 (.641)
Deregulatory Reforms	.270 (.396)	-1.029* (.599)
Subsidized Reforms	-.122 (.323)	.322 (.464)
<i>Demographics</i>		
Married	.226* (.119)	-.314* (.180)
Female	.174 (.119)	.124 (.169)
Age	.832*** (.286)	.125 (.420)
Education	1.047* (.606)	.226 (.794)
Constant	-2.101*** (.597)	-1.960*** (.954)
p	-.010 (.349)	

DATA SOURCE: American Politics Study 2000.

NOTE: Sample selection probit model; N = 752. Standard errors in parentheses.

\*p &lt; .10; \*\*p &lt; .05; \*\*\*p &lt; .001.

TABLE 5.4 Change in probability for presidential vote model

	No Vote	Vote Republican	Vote Democratic
Democratic Identifier	0.04	-0.26	0.23
Independent	0.23	-0.25	0.02
Economic Evaluation	-0.06	-0.05	0.11
Government Spending	0.03	-0.10	0.07
Middle-Class-Only Tax Cut	-0.02	-0.02	0.04
Family Values	0.05	-0.08	0.03
Regulatory Reforms	-0.08	0.04	0.04
Deregulatory Reforms	-0.06	0.08	-0.02
Subsidized Reforms	0.03	-0.04	0.00

DATA SOURCE: American Politics Study 2000.

NOTE: Change in probability given a change from a low value (highest of either mean minus two standard deviations or lowest possible value) to a high value (lowest of either mean plus two standard deviations or highest possible value). Estimates are based on the model presented in Table 5.3.

federal role in protecting family values. Other issues—family values, tax cuts, and the economy—all had lower impacts on vote choice than campaign finance reform.<sup>9</sup> Voting for Gore was affected by attitudes toward government spending, family values, the economy, and, finally, deregulation of the campaign finance reform system. These estimates show that attitudes toward deregulation—the most conservative of the reform proposals—were clearly an important determinant of the voting decision in the 2000 presidential election.

We now turn to the congressional model. We again use the sample selection model and the same variables with three sets of exceptions.<sup>10</sup> First, we include measures to control for incumbency and challenger quality. Because our candidate choice is partisan (i.e., 1 = Democrat, 0 = Republican), we use three dummy variables to account for the quality of the candidates: Democratic incumbent and high-quality Republican challenger, Democratic incumbent and low-quality Republican challenger, and Republican incumbent and high-quality Democratic challenger. Races with Republican incumbents and low-quality Democratic challengers are the baseline. We expect citizens who have Democrat incumbents to be more likely to vote for the Democrat and those who have a Republican incumbent and high-quality Democratic challenger to show a greater probability of voting for the Democrat in comparison to the baseline category. Second, we include a measure of the difference between Democratic and Republican campaign expenditures. Finally, we include the incumbent's grade by Common Cause to control for the candidates' stance on electoral and government policies. We include these three sets of measures as part of the candidate-choice equations because we expect them to affect the vote choice but not turnout.

Table 5.5 presents the congressional model.<sup>11</sup> Voter turnout in the congressional model was similar to that in the presidential model. Voter turnout

TABLE 5.5 Model of congressional vote

	Vote for Democratic Candidate	Vote for Republican Candidate
<i>Political Engagement</i>		
Efficacy	.413*** (.158)	—
Interest in Politics	1.039*** (.202)	—
Political Knowledge	1.014*** (.228)	—
<i>Partisanship</i>		
Democratic Identifier	—	1.630*** (.237)
Independent	—1.37 (.118)	—
<i>Policy Attitudes</i>		
Economic Evaluation	—1.37 (.118)	—
Government Spending	—1.37 (.118)	—
Middle-Class-Only Tax Cut	—1.37 (.118)	—
<i>Family Values</i>		
Family Values	—1.37 (.118)	—
<i>Campaign Finance Reform</i>		
Regulatory Reforms	—1.37 (.118)	—
Deregulatory Reforms	—1.37 (.118)	—
Subsidized Reforms	—1.37 (.118)	—
<i>Campaign Characteristics</i>		
Democratic Spending Ratio	—1.37 (.118)	—
Democrat Incumbent & High-Quality Challenger	—1.37 (.118)	—
Democrat Incumbent & Low-Quality Challenger	—1.37 (.118)	—
Republican Incumbent & High-Quality Challenger	—1.37 (.118)	—
Incumbent Common Cause Grade	—1.37 (.118)	—
<i>Demographics</i>		
Married	—1.37 (.118)	—
Female	—1.37 (.118)	—
Age	—1.37 (.118)	—
Education	—1.37 (.118)	—
Constant	—1.37 (.118)	—
p	—1.37 (.118)	—

DATA SOURCE: American Politics Study 2000.  
NOTE: Sample selection probit model; N = 726. Includes incumbent races only. Robust standard errors in parentheses; observations clustered by congressional district.  
\* p < .10; \*\* p < .05; \*\*\* p < .001.

Effects of Campaign Finance Attitudes

TABLE 5.6 Change in probability for congressional vote model

	No Vote	Vote Republican	Vote Democratic
Democrat Identifier	0.05	-0.35	0.30
Independent	0.12	-0.14	0.02
Economic Evaluation	0.02	-0.12	0.10
Government Spending	-0.03	-0.16	0.19
Middle-Class-Only Tax Cut	-0.10	0.06	0.04
Family Values	0.07	-0.14	0.06
Regulatory Reforms	-0.06	0.15	-0.09
Deregulatory Reforms	0.01	0.20	-0.21
Subsidized Reforms	0.10	-0.22	0.12
Democrat Incumbent & High-Quality Challenger	0.00	-0.26	0.25
Democrat Incumbent & Low-Quality Challenger	0.00	-0.20	0.20
Republican Incumbent & High-Quality Challenger	0.00	-0.10	0.10

DATA SOURCE: American Politics Study 2000.  
NOTE: Change in probability given a change from a low value (highest of either mean minus two standard deviations or lowest possible value) to a high value (lowest of either mean plus two standard deviations or highest possible value). Estimates are based on the model presented in table 5.5.

was influenced by individual characteristics—efficacy, interest in politics, knowledge, and demographics. The vote-choice model is similar to the presidential vote model in that partisanship and issues both determine vote choice. The model also shows the importance of the quality of the two candidates. Those voters with Democratic incumbents are more likely to vote for the Democrat. Those with Republican incumbents are more likely to vote for the Republican. In addition, voters are more likely to choose incumbents if the opposition candidate has no prior experience.

Attitudes toward campaign finance reform also affect the vote choice between Democratic and Republican candidates. Those who believe that the current system should be deregulated are more likely to vote Republican; those who disagree are more likely to vote Democratic. Similarly, those who believe that the government should subsidize our campaigns and elections are more likely to vote Democratic; those who disagree are more likely to vote Republican.

We present the change in probabilities in Table 5.6 to show the relative impact of these determinants on the voting decision. Compared to Republicans, Democrats have a 0.30 greater probability of voting the Democratic candidate; independents have a 0.02 greater probability. The greatest determinant after partisanship is incumbency and the quality of the challenger. Incumbents are more likely to receive votes than opposition candidates; stronger opponents do better than less-experienced opponents. Of the issues, campaign finance reform has the greatest effect on the vote because attitudes toward both deregulation and subsidies determine the choice be-



tween candidates. Those who favor deregulation have a 0.20 greater probability of voting for a Republican and a 0.21 lesser probability of voting for a Democrat. Those who favor subsidies for campaigns have a 0.12 greater probability of voting for a Democrat and a 0.22 lesser probability of voting for a Republican. As in the presidential model, attitudes toward reform are strong determinants of congressional vote choice.

#### Discussion and Conclusion

Americans clearly wish to see the campaign financing system overhauled. Given the twenty-eight-year gap between the FECA (1974) and the BCRA (2002), it is not surprising that loopholes need to be closed and adjustments made. As Potter (2001, 1) points out, "no law is a permanent fix."

Our work moves beyond recognizing the widespread call for reform to investigating the specific reforms that Americans support as well as the impact of public attitudes about campaign finance on turnout and vote choice in the 2000 presidential and congressional elections. We conclude that although most Americans want the campaign finance system reformed, and although the call for reform reached a high level of prominence during the 2000 campaign season, the issue did not impact turnout. Among the myriad of factors that could affect voters' decisions in the 2000 elections, voter attitudes on campaign finance reform did matter, though this was limited to attitudes toward reforms on which the parties took opposing positions. Vote choice was affected by "extreme" proposals—deregulation and subsidies—and not "mainstream" regulatory attitudes. Voter cynicism is reaching a high point in American politics and is partially driven by dissatisfaction with the current campaign finance system.

Beyond showing the effect of campaign finance reform at the polls, the modeling results have normative implications for any discussion of campaign finance reform. Specifically, one is immediately struck by the important role of incumbency and challenger quality in the congressional model of turnout and vote choice. That reform is needed is suggested by the following facts: that incumbent war chests deter competition (Goldenberg, Trautogott, and Baumgartner 1986; Fritz and Morris 1992; Box-Steffensmeier 1996), the buildup of which is facilitated by the current financing system, and that incumbency plays a large role in congressional voting decisions. Specifically, the lack of competitive congressional races shows that the scale that balances the democratic ideals of free speech and equality should be tipped toward equality while respectfully recognizing the value of free speech. A shift in the balance should increase competition, and ultimately the quality of congressional races and the responsiveness of elected officials. Moreover, such a shift would satisfy the expressed preferences of the American electorate (Gallup 2001).

#### MEASUREMENT APPENDIX

*Campaign Finance Reform Proposals:* I'm going to read you some different proposals to change the way federal election campaigns are run. As I read each proposal, tell me if you would strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the change. How about this proposal . . . (question order was determined by randomized start)

1. Place a limit on spending by congressional candidates?
2. Limit TV advertising of congressional candidates?
3. Provide public funding for congressional candidates?
4. Eliminate large soft-money contributions?
5. Ban political action committees from giving money to congressional candidates?
6. Allow individuals to make larger gifts to candidates?
7. Eliminate all limitations and require full disclosure?
8. Allow parties to make larger gifts to candidates?
9. Give free media time and free postage to candidates?
10. Require candidates for the U.S. House and Senate to raise a certain percentage of their campaign funds within their own states?

*Political Efficacy:* Our measure of political efficacy is an additive index of three questions. Higher values on this index indicate greater political efficacy.

1. "How much do elections make government pay attention to what people think?" (always, most of the time, some of the time)
2. "Public officials don't care much what people like me think." (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)
3. "People like me don't have any say about what the government does." (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)

*Political Knowledge:* Our measure of political knowledge was formed by summing correct responses to five questions. Three of the questions dealt with respondents' knowledge of campaign finance while two inquired about politics more generally.

1. "As far as you know, how much money does current law allow private citizens to give directly to the campaigns of candidates for president and Congress? As much as they want, only a limited amount, or are they not allowed to contribute any money?"
2. "As far as you know, how much money does current law allow private citizens to give to political parties for party-building activities such as get-out-the-vote efforts? As much as they want, only a limited amount, or are they not allowed to contribute any money?"

3. "Do you happen to know which party received the most money in campaign contributions this year?"
4. "Who has the final responsibility to decide if a law is constitutional or not . . . is it the president, the Congress, the Supreme Court, or don't you know?"
5. "Do you happen to know which party had the most members in the House of Representatives in Washington before the November election?"

*Political Interest:* To measure political interest, respondents were asked the following question. "In general, how interested are you in politics and elections? Would you say . . . very interested, somewhat interested, not too interested, or not at all interested?"

*Economic Evaluations:* How about the economy as a whole? Would you say that over the past year the nation's economy has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse? [If respondent replies better or worse] Would you say it has gotten much [better/worse] or somewhat [better/worse]?

*Attitude on Government Spending:* The government should spend more money to help people, even if it means increasing taxes (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree).

*Attitudes on Tax Cuts:* The government should cut taxes for the middle class but not for the very wealthy (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree).

*Attitudes on Government Protection of Family Values:* The federal government needs to protect traditional family values and morality (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree).

*Partisanship:* Party identification was measured by the following instrument: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, independent, or what?"

*Age:* Respondents' age in years.

*Sex:* A dummy variable was used to denote respondents' sex (female = 1).

*Education:* What is the highest grade or year of school you have completed? *Married:* A dummy variable was used to denote married respondents (married = 1).

*Voter Turnout:* In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people were not able to vote because they weren't registered, they were sick, or they just didn't have time. How about you? Did you vote in the elections this November?

*Vote Choice:* How about the election for president? Who did you vote for?

## 6 Ideology in the 2000 Election: A Study in Ambivalence

WILLIAM G. JACOBY

Many treatments of the 2000 election have emphasized themes that are specific to the various presidential candidates. Questions about George W. Bush's intelligence, concerns about Al Gore's sincerity, and speculation about Ralph Nader's motivations provide three prominent examples. Interestingly, however, most popular treatments of the election have downplayed a phenomenon that has been shown to exert a pervasive impact on many aspects of American politics: liberal and conservative ideology. This lack of attention is particularly surprising, given the ideological tone of some Republican campaign rhetoric along with the aggressively conservative policy agenda that President Bush has pursued since taking office.

This chapter will try to bridge the "ideological gap" in our understanding of the 2000 presidential election by examining the prevalence and impact of liberal and conservative thinking within the 2000 American electorate. In other words, to what extent did liberal and conservative ideas serve to structure the electoral environment, citizens' issue orientations, political perceptions, and voting choices during the contest between George W. Bush and Al Gore? I will employ data from the 2000 National Election Study (NES) to address this question.

The answer appears to be somewhat mixed: on the one hand, the campaign environment was infused with an unusually high level of explicitly ideological rhetoric, stimulated for the most part by Bush's "compassionate conservatism." Voters clearly recognized this and responded accordingly in their assessments of the candidates.

On the other hand, individual liberal-conservative identifications had little, if any, direct impact on citizens' choices between Al Gore and George Bush. Accordingly, 2000 could be characterized as a clear example of a non-